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Summary1 
 
Globalising labour markets reflect an international move to more flexible labour systems 
which has resulted in the growth of various forms of social-economic insecurity and 
inequality. In particular, distribution of income at global, national and personal level has 
become more unequal, benefiting capital much more than labour.  
 
The main trends and challenges that social and labour market policies should address 
include population ageing, migration and urbanisation, de-industrialisation and the 
increasing importance of the service sector, the spread of informal employment especially 
among women and unemployment. All these trends have an impact on poverty and 
inequality to different extents. 
 
The paper sets out to evaluate the performance in terms of poverty alleviation of 
conventional labour market and social policies and arrangements in the era of globalised 
labour markets. To this end, it develops a framework based on five policy evaluation 
principles, centred on the normative notion of social justice, whereby the expansion of 
full freedom requires basic economic security for all. 
 
Regulatory interventions with respect to child labour and discrimination are important 
tools against poverty and inequality although more resources should be devoted to ensure 
their implementation. Indeed, providing families with economic security and removing 
obstacles to school enrolment are much more effective ways of reducing child labour and 
poverty. Statutory minimum wages do not perform well where informality and flexible 
labour relations are widespread; however, they still provide a standard of decency for 
employers and workers to aim at. 
 
Old-style unemployment insurance benefit schemes are disappearing even in 
industrialised countries and the prospects for their extension in developing countries are 
slim while, evidence on the impact of labour market training on poverty is scarce. More 
broadly, it is argued that both social insurance and means-tested social assistance forms 
of income support have failed to provide adequate and dignified protection to the 
majority of labour force.  
 
More promising results have been yielded by social pensions, by definition universal and 
rights-based. They are easy to administer, transparent and affordable because of the low 
amounts provided; they have beneficial effects on livelihoods and social development.  
Their redistributive impact, however, is tied to the progressiveness of the tax system that 
funds them.  
 
While food-for-work schemes may be appropriate in extreme circumstances, their 
drawbacks in terms of the paternalistic attitudes involved and of the negative effects on 
participants’ health of certain types of onerous labour, make them inappropriate for 
promoting sustainable livelihoods. This is true also for public work schemes, especially 
where the objective of maximising employment leads to highly labour-intensive methods 
                                                 
1 Thanks are due to several readers for their comments on the first draft. 
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based on unskilled, poorly supervised and ill-trained labour. In addition, public works 
have been criticised for ineffective targeting, substantial leakages, corruption and 
inefficient implementation. Furthermore, they tend to discriminate against women and 
people with disabilities, often without even paying decent wages.  
 
Employment subsidies, though widespread globally, rarely reach the poor and distort 
global trade as they allow firms to pay lower wages; sometimes, they work more as a 
subsidy to capital than to workers. Since they are meant to support paid labour, other 
forms of work such as non-wage economic activities and care are excluded from this type 
of social protection. 
 
Micro-finance and micro-credit have been enjoying huge popularity as development 
tools. Their focus on participation, empowerment – especially of women – and creating 
opportunities for small investments in self-employment and job creation have been 
underlined as very positive features. Still, concerns are raised as to the sustainability of 
the schemes and their limited scope in the face of systemic risk and shocks. In addition, 
they are criticised for creating a new form of dependency for poor people, as the credit 
obtained has to be paid back. Costs in terms of time and pressures should also be factored 
in when evaluating the sustainability of group loans. 
 
Cash transfers offer a number of advantages in terms of speed, transparency and dignity 
as they recognise to beneficiaries the freedom to make choices on how to spend the 
money received. Evaluations of different cash transfer schemes in developing countries 
show that these forms of income support helped generate work and income security while 
at the same time enabling beneficiaries to make strategic choices for themselves and 
maintain their livelihoods even in difficult circumstances. Positive impacts on the 
accumulation of assets by household and on reducing the pressures to migrate in search 
of income have also been observed.  
 
In conclusion, most labour market interventions reviewed have suffered from common 
failures such as lack of transparency and accountability, high costs, chronic inefficiency 
in terms of misused resources and ineffective targeting, thus failing most of the time to 
reach the poorest and to reduce inequalities in labour markets. They rarely meet any of 
the policy evaluation principles proposed in the paper. Yet, countries are still encouraged 
to use these conventional policies, which were developed in the context of industrialised 
countries.  
 
The message is, thus, that not too much can be expected from labour market policies. 
These policies may help in making labour markets function better but their contribution 
towards overcoming poverty and economic insecurity can only be limited. Labour 
markets are part of the broader economic system: policymakers should look to social 
policies in order to deal with poverty and the misdistribution of income rather than expect 
labour markets to deal with these fundamental features of a market economy. 
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1. Introduction 
 
We are in the midst of a global transformation in which one of the most distinctive 
features is the painful evolution of a globalising labour market, testifying not only to the 
spread of capitalism to all parts of the world economy but also to the establishment of a 
particular variant of capitalism under the loose term of globalisation. This is based on 
increasingly liberalised markets in all respects, most notably involving open markets in 
capital and technology that are currently more open than markets for labour.   
 
An irony of recent theoretical and empirical research on social policy has been that 
the increasing resort to typologies and ‘welfare regimes’, principally by sociologists, has 
coincided with the global transformation that is accelerating the pace of international 
convergence of policies and institutions. It turns out that there is little path dependency, 
since governments of country after country are finding that they must adapt to global 
pressures. In countries such as Sweden and Finland, long regarded as epitomising 
particular social democratic systems lauded by social policy enthusiasts, institutions and 
labour market and social protection policies are rapidly changing and are being moved in 
the direction of means-testing and behaviour-testing selectivity. The famed “Swedish 
model” is a thing of the past. Meanwhile, the governments of China and India are rushing 
to make their labour markets more flexible, and policymakers there are using the same 
rationale as voiced in countries of western or eastern Europe, for example. 
 
The bare stylised facts, described in section 3, are perhaps sufficient for this 
particular paper. Of most relevance, globalisation reflects an international move to more 
flexible labour systems, in which all forms of flexibility are gaining ground – external, 
internal or functional, wage system, etc. (Standing 1999a). But perversely the underlying 
economic model is based on the belief that all markets should be flexible. In effect, this is 
the first time in history when all groups in all societies are expected to face insecurity, 
and accept risk-taking as a way of life.  
 
The outcome has been a growth in various forms of socio-economic insecurity and 
a dramatic growth of several forms of economic inequality, which show no signs of being 
reversed in the near future. In particular, the functional distribution of income within 
countries and across the global economy has shifted strongly, giving workers (labour) a 
reduced share and capital (profits) a much greater share. Personal income distribution has 
also become more unequal, and wage differentials between those with tertiary schooling 
and others have also tended to widen.  
 
Although the matter is still controversial, it is widely accepted that these trends 
reflect the impact of globalisation and economic liberalisation, rather than the impact of 
technological and structural changes that have raised the return to education. This is an 
important aspect of debates around labour market policies, since it suggests that policies 
to alter the characteristics of workers would not be the appropriate answer to the 
inequality and poverty associated with globalisation.                
 
2. The Global Labour Market Model 
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Since the 1970s, the hegemonic economic model has been called ‘neo-liberal’, and 
has been guided by the Chicago school of law-and-economics and by the rather elastic 
notion of the Washington Consensus. As far as labour markets and policy are concerned, 
the dominant model of the period following the Second World War could be described as 
essentially neo-corporatist, with the expectation that protective labour law and labour 
regulations would spread to developing countries, that collective bargaining would cover 
more and more of the rising formal employment and that more and more workers would 
become employees in standard full-time employment and belong to trades unions. A 
regime of labour inspection, labour law and protective labour regulations was expected to 
sweep the world. 
 
Since the 1970s, that world has been fading everywhere. Where it had hardly taken 
root, as in much of Africa, the changes in this period have actually been less than where it 
had developed rather extensively. The old model had offered a future of industrial 
citizenship; that is no longer seen as the future (Standing 2007a). If there is a dominant 
model at the moment, it is one geared to maximise labour informalisation and labour 
market flexibility, with state efforts to decentralise and individualise bargaining over all 
labour matters.  
 
Although China has introduced new labour laws that give labour law a greater role, 
in other parts of the world labour law has been weakened, in terms of scope and 
implementation. It has proved inappropriate for the many forms of work and labour that 
lie outside the standard employment relationship, since in many flexible labour 
relationships the identification of the ‘employer’ and ‘employee’ is hard or impossible.  
 
Meanwhile, protective interventions via labour inspection have been under-
resourced, implicitly allowing employers more scope to flexibilise their labour relations. 
Many governments have taken the route, openly advocated by multinationals and national 
business organisations, as well as by international financial agencies such as the World 
Bank and IMF, to curb or even ban trade unions, thereby limiting freedom of association, 
freedom to bargain collectively and the right to strike. This is not a model of labour 
market de-regulation, but of systematic re-regulation. The essence of the re-regulation is 
the promotion of competitiveness and the systematic attempt to erode or block institutions 
and mechanisms that are collective and collaborative in character. This active promotion 
of competitiveness is the essence of what is commonly called neo-liberalism.  
     
 
3. Labour Market Trends 
 
Before considering the advantages and disadvantages of specific labour market 
policies, one should summarise the main trends and challenges that labour market and 
social policies should address. The issues selected reflect the focus of this paper, which is 
the relief of poverty and insecurity in developing countries. 
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Above all, the global labour force has quadrupled since 1980, and the increase in 
labour supply available for open labour markets has risen at a faster rate, particularly 
since China and India have liberalised their economies, allowing multinationals to shift 
all or part of their production to extremely low-wage areas in which there is effectively 
an unlimited labour supply at existing wage rates. In the next three decades, the rate of 
increase may slow, but all commentators agree that, unless there is a human catastrophe 
of unprecedented proportions, the world’s working-age population will continue to grow.     
 
(a) Ageing 
 
A first feature to note is that the demographic structure of the world’s population 
has been changing in ways that must force policymakers to consider alternative 
interventions. In particular, ageing is a global trend. Already a majority of the world’s 
elderly live in developing countries. It has been said that China will become ‘old’ before 
it becomes ‘rich’. It is by no means alone in that. Responding to the impoverishment of 
the elderly is certainly not a developed country problem alone.   
 
Certainly, there are many millions of disaffected youth in developing countries, 
particularly congregating in urban slums and thus capable of expressing collective anger. 
They tend to receive the bulk of attention from labour market policymakers - 
understandably, since they often pose a threat of taking to the streets. However, policies 
to enable older people to have a dignifying livelihood will surely come to have a much 
higher priority in coming years. It is to be hoped that the positive lessons to be learned 
from the prolonged experience with so-called social pensions in several developing 
countries, such as Namibia, Nepal and South Africa, will encourage governments to use 
them to a much greater extent. 
  
(b) Migration and Urbanisation 
  
Another key feature of the challenge ahead is that the 21st century will be the urban 
century, when for the first time in human history a majority of people of the world will be 
living in or around urban areas. As part of that process, various forms of migration are 
spreading, and much of the movement is linked to labour and the increasingly transient 
and precarious nature of labour relations. It is still insufficiently appreciated how much 
the various types of mobility affect patterns of poverty and inequality, and how migration 
patterns provide the context in which social and labour market policies have to be 
evaluated. 
 
The current international mobility of the privileged and highly educated minority is 
extraordinary, with growing numbers of people circulating around the globe, many 
attached to multinationals or national or supra-national agencies. These are not the 
subject of this paper, but they have been shaping the perceptions and design of social and 
labour market policy.  
 
More directly relevant is the growth of international household chains, whereby 
millions of people migrate from some low-income area in developing countries to 
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perform menial labour in rich and middle-income countries, often leaving behind them 
structurally vulnerable households and families who become dependent on remittances. 
The role of remittances is important, since their sheer size – almost certainly chronically 
underestimated in official statistics – can bolster living standards for those fortunate 
enough to receive them, while possibly accentuating class differentiation in the low-
income sending areas and in the typically more urban environments to which many 
migrants go. 
 
While migration is likely to reduce poverty for many, and while we should be in 
favour of liberalising the movement of people globally, the challenge is to devise policies 
that address the adverse effects of human movement. In that respect, inevitably, the 
global growth of migration in its various forms has been associated with a huge growth in 
the number of people who are short-term residents wherever they are, often either illegals 
or undocumented.  
 
It is insufficiently appreciated that much of the migration taking place in the world 
is between developing countries, and it has been a cause of social tensions in some of the 
in-migration countries, the latest case being South Africa. An estimated two of every five 
migrants are in developing countries (Ratha and Shaw 2005). More than two-thirds of all 
migrants from sub-Saharan African countries are in other parts of the continent. 
 
The treatment of migrant workers is a growing source of impoverishment around 
the world. Almost certainly, the most glaring instance of this is in China. Many 
enterprises there simply do not enroll migrant workers in social insurance – thereby 
avoiding a sizable contribution wedge in the wage bill (over 30%) – and there is 
considerable anecdotal evidence that this is tacitly allowed by many local governments 
across China (Liu 2003). 
 
Migration policy in both sending and receiving countries will influence poverty to 
an increasing extent. The globalising labour market requires more sophisticated 
interventions to regulate labour migration, not to restrict it. The knee-jerk reaction of 
some Third Worldists is that there should be unlimited migration from developing to 
developed countries. This would accord with a truly liberalised market system. Some 
economists have also estimated that if migration was liberalised the world economy 
would grow by some huge amount.  
 
Let in some common sense. This would be politically explosive and would almost 
certainly lead to the opposite of what liberals would wish. Demagogues such as Le Pen 
and Berlusconi would be made heroes in countries in which migrants were seen to pose a 
threat to the established living standards of the working class and the precariat. Coercive 
social policy would soon follow. Migrants would be subject to discriminatory treatment, 
abuse and expulsion, and the flow of remittances that is so crucial in the fight against 
poverty and economic insecurity in developing countries would shrink. 
 
Far better would be a gradual, regulated process by which investment would shift to 
countries in which real wages are lower because living standards and the cost of living 
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are still lower, while migration to the rich industrialised countries increases at a pace that 
can be absorbed without being seen as lowering living standards of workers there. 
 
Policies to facilitate labour circulation could also be beneficial. In that regard, the 
proposal by the European Union’s Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs, Franco 
Frattini, of a “Blue Card” (along the lines of the USA’s Green Card) should be 
considered seriously. The idea is that it would ease the temporary in-migration of workers 
for specific jobs, with contracts drawn up before the migration. It could limit the super-
exploitation and abuse of the more vulnerable and poorer migrants. It would spread a 
form of gastarbeiter, and might even lead to countries operating import quotas for 
foreign workers.  
 
There would be drawbacks. But it must be recognised that any political solution 
would be a compromise. The fact remains that, just as unlimited capital mobility is 
conducive to economic instability, so unlimited labour mobility would be conducive to 
social instability and could easily foment xenophobia and unsavoury political extremism. 
 
The European Union is planning to set up job centres in north Africa to offer a legal 
avenue for labour circulation into legal jobs in EU countries. It has started one in Mali. 
This is a pioneering labour market policy, which is best seen as an experiment that 
deserves careful monitoring before it is replicated in many other countries. Many 
questions arise. Should such agencies be required to operate on an efficiency or social 
equity basis? Should the costs be borne by the governments, the migrant workers or the 
employers of the migrants? Where should their incomes be taxed? Under which country’s 
labour laws should they be protected? Should the agencies provide advisory services and 
social protection to the migrants? Where would legal liability lie, in case of injury or 
illness, or even false information as to qualifications or working conditions? Should the 
job centre operate an affirmative action function, opting to give priority to women or the 
poorest or members of disadvantaged groups? 
 
There are no easy answers to such questions. But they must be asked and some 
answer should be given and be made transparent. There is a wider point here. 
Globalisation and the globalising labour process are changing the concept of citizenship 
and the patterns of income earning and income distribution. Innovative labour and social 
policy is and should be part of that process. In a sense, one may say that there is no 
longer social policy in one country; it is being globalised.                    
 
(c) Tertiarisation and De-industrialisation 
 
From a structural point of view, the global system is increasingly characterised by 
tertiarisation, whereby most people in jobs are doing service activities, rather than 
agricultural, mining or manufacturing labour. Even in the two industrial workshops of the 
21st century world economy, China and India, historically very rapid rates of industrial 
growth have not been associated with growth of manufacturing employment.  
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In many countries, there has been premature de-industrialisation, largely associated 
with people trying to survive by doing petty service activities that involve few or any 
barriers to entry, and thus allow extensive under-employment. But even aside from that 
well-documented phenomenon, more and more formal jobs are in service activities. This 
will continue to be the pattern and trend, and should be the reference point in designing 
modern labour market and social policies. 
 
(d) Informalisation 
 
This leads us to reiterate what has been the defining feature of the globalisation era, 
the spread of informalisation. In the first three-quarters of the 20th century, the 
expectation was essentially Ricardian and articulated in a famous article by Arthur Lewis 
published in 1954, whereby initial economic development took place with an unlimited 
supply of labour, epitomised by the steady transfer of workers from informal to formal 
employment at a constant real wage in the formal sectors (Lewis 1954).  
 
By the 1970s, it was apparent that, even if that process had existed, it had broken 
down. Far from being a residual that would shrink as the economy industrialised, the so-
called ‘informal sector’ was growing. Subsequent analysis and empirical study made 
clear that treating all those outside the modern formal economy as a homogenous sector 
was inaccurate and an impediment to sound policymaking. Informalisation was 
pervasive; in fact, large modern enterprises have been leading the way in informalising 
by contracting out much of their labour function, using sub-contractors, casual labour and 
agency labour. In addition, partly driven by structural adjustment programmes, state 
enterprises in many countries systematically contracted out large parts of their formal 
employment, turning what had been the sector setting formal standards into far more 
informalised entities.  
 
In sum, it is the formal standard employment relation that has been shrinking in 
many countries. That is the context in which 21st century labour market policies must be 
designed. The national labour model promoted by the ILO, based around the standard 
employment relation, is withering, and is extremely unlikely to be resurrected (Standing 
2008b).        
 
Labour informalisation is associated with precariousness, lack of labour contracts 
and widespread illegality, with most of the labour taking place in small establishments or 
in the streets. On average, incomes and wages are much lower for informal labour (see, 
e.g., Sengupta et al. 2008; Fundação SEADE, 2005). But it would be a mistake to 
interpret informalisation as merely chronic impoverished under-employment, since many 
formal enterprises are rapidly informalising large parts of their employment, while many 
people actually chose to work informally.  
 
(e) Unemployment 
      
Unemployment tends to be the phenomenon that receives most attention from 
labour economists. This remains a contentious subject. In developing countries, open 
 11 
unemployment remains a poor indicator of the incidence of poverty, and the open 
unemployment rate is often a thoroughly misleading indicator of the state of the labour 
market (ILO 2004; Standing et al. 1996). In some cases, a rise in open unemployment 
may be a sign of an improvement in the underlying labour situation. Open unemployment 
would tend to rise if there were benefits on offer and if there were opportunities to 
register at labour exchanges, whereas in many low-income economies and communities 
people who would otherwise emerge as unemployed eke out an existence through 
extremely low-productivity activities, including begging.   
 
The fact that the open unemployment rate is not a reliable indicator of poverty 
should not be taken to mean that unemployment is not serious, or that many of those who 
are in a status of unemployment are not suffering considerable economic hardship and a 
stigmatising existence. However, it is noteworthy that in many developing countries the 
incidence of open unemployment is higher for relatively well-educated youth from 
middle-class households and communities. Part of the reason is that they can rely on 
family members to provide them with some support and part of the reason is that they 
tend to live in urban areas. The poorest cannot afford to be openly and fully unemployed. 
  
(f) Global feminisation 
 
Another feature of the globalised labour system is global feminisation (Standing 
1989, 1999b). This reflects a double trend – a spread of precarious forms of labour and a 
relative growth of employment of women, the latter partly reflecting the restructuring of 
employment and labour towards the sort of jobs traditionally taken by women. 
 
Some distinguished economists have interpreted rising female labour force 
participation as a sign of women’s liberation and sense of agency. This is simplistic. 
Many young women have been driven to migrate into export processing zones, to take 
onerous jobs and to send back remittances to rural families. Often they have suffered 
long-term ill-health and have been exposed to social illnesses of various kinds, as when 
they are driven into prostitution, drug addiction and alcoholism. There is also plenty of 
evidence that many women who enter the labour market in low-income economies do not 
receive all the income they earn. Particularly when working as outworkers, they are 
subject to various mechanisms of control, by family members or middlemen, whereby 
much of the income is taken away (ILO 2004). Ensuring that they can retain the income 
they earn would be one of the most effective labour market policies of all.              
 
4. Conventional Labour Market Policies 
 
What we might call conventional labour market policies are those that were 
developed during the course of the 20th century as part of welfare state capitalism. These 
included minimum wage policy, unemployment insurance benefits and labour market 
training schemes. They also cover schemes to promote various forms of mobility – 
geographical, occupational and social.    
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With all forms of labour market policy – and social policy in general – there has 
been insufficient evaluation of their effects and effectiveness. This is particularly true for 
policies that have been tried in developing countries. In some cases, there is what should 
be described as monitoring, but not evaluation. For example, statistics may be produced 
on the number ‘covered’ or the number of participants in a particular policy or scheme. 
These do not constitute sufficient indicators for an evaluation of their effectiveness, 
although they are almost certainly necessary information. Thus, official statistics may 
show that 1,000 workers were covered by a wage subsidy. Some commentators may use 
that sort of figure to claim that the subsidy generated 1,000 jobs. A moment’s reflection 
should be enough to realise that such statements are naïve or disingenuous. The workers 
or firms benefiting from the subsidy may simply be displacing others not receiving the 
subsidy. 
 
A further difficulty with evaluating labour market policies is that they usually have 
several objectives, some of which may be in conflict with others and some of which may 
be unstated by the policymakers. For instance, they may be rationalised as instruments 
for reducing poverty or unemployment and as instruments for improving economic 
growth and productivity. But which of those objectives has priority? If short-term growth 
and productivity improvement were uppermost, the actual policy might concentrate on 
raising the employment of the highly educated and others with formal skills, since their 
short-term productivity would be greater than would be likely among the poor and less 
educated. Of course, the beneficiaries in such circumstances would be unlikely to be the 
desperately impoverished. Indeed, in some cases laying off workers would be a way of 
raising average productivity and boosting profitability and growth; this was a deliberate 
policy persued by the Chinese Government in the 1990s. Many workers who had been in 
chronic unpaid under-employment eventually emerged as unemployed or were absorbed 
in private employment. The ‘success’ of the policy could not be measured by the change 
of unemployment.  
 
The important point is that evaluation should be based on clear and specified 
criteria. As developed elsewhere (ILO 2004; see also, Standing 2002), if respect for 
economic and social rights is uppermost, one could argue that all policies should be 
assessed by whether or not they satisfy the five Policy Principles that are summarised in 
the Box below. 
 
 
    
Five Policy Evaluation Principles 
 
 In evaluating any policy, five principles could be used to determine whether it 
advances social justice. Briefly, these are as follows: 
 
   1.  The Security Difference Principle 
 
A policy or institutional change is socially just only if it improves the security and 
work prospects of the least secure groups in society. 
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The Security Difference Principle stems from Rawls (1973), who from a liberal 
philosophical perspective essentially argued that social and economic inequalities are 
socially just only if they allow for the betterment of the worst-off groups in society.  
 
2. The Paternalism Test Principle 
 
A policy or institutional change is socially just only if it does not impose controls 
on some groups that are not imposed on the most free groups in society. 
 
Underlying this principle is the Millian liberal view that there is a prima facie case 
against paternalism (except in the case of young children and those who are medically 
frail), particularly against those forms that constrain the freedoms of the disadvantaged.  
 
3. The Rights-not-Charity Principle 
 
A policy or institutional change is socially just if it enhances the rights of the 
recipient of benefits or services and limits the discretionary power of the 
providers. 
 
This principle is also crucial for evaluation purposes. A right is possessed as a 
mark of a person’s humanity or citizenship, and cannot be made dependent on some 
behavioural conditionality. Social and economic entitlements should be rights, not 
matters for the discretionary decisions of bureaucrats or philanthropists or aid donors, 
however well meaning they may be. 
 
The “right to work”, much discussed and asserted for the past 150 years, is 
relevant here. One cannot sensibly say that there is a right for every person to be given a 
job of their unrestrained choice. Not everybody can be President or Chief Executive.What 
one could defend is the principle that everybody should have a claim right to an equally 
good opportunity to pursue and develop their work capacities and competencies. 
Guaranteeing people ‘jobs’ that they do not want is scarcely an affirmation of any right 
to work. But creating the space, the security, for them to pursue a dignifying working life 
surely is.
2
 
 
4. The Ecological Constraint Principle 
 
A policy or institutional change is socially just only if it does not involve an 
ecological cost borne by the community or by those directly affected.  
 
 
 
                                                 
2 For a definition of the right to work along these lines, see Article 1 of Title 1 of the Charter of Emerging 
Human Rights, adopted at the Barcelona Social Forum in November 2004 (Institut de Drets Humans de 
Catalunya 2004). 
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Any policy, such as transfer schemes or job creation schemes, should be subject to 
the constraint that they should not deliberately or wilfully (carelessly) jeopardise the 
environment. In this context, for instance, one could argue that subsidies intended to 
boost skills, employment or job-creating investment should be modified to promote only 
ecologically beneficial work and skills. 
 
The ecological constraint principle raises emotional reactions, with claims that any 
such condition is a protectionist device that penalises developing countries, forcing them 
to slow economic growth and incurring costs that hinder development. Regrettably, in the 
coming decades, global warming and other forms of pollution – including many 
emanating from poor working conditions in the specious interest of job promotion – will 
hurt many more people in developing countries and do so more devastatingly than in 
most rich parts of the world. The principle must be respected everywhere.  
 
5. The Dignified Work Principle          
 
A policy or institutional change is just only if it does not block people from pursuing 
work in a dignified way and if it does not disadvantage the most insecure groups in 
that respect. 
 
The two-part test in this principle involves two implicit value judgments – that work 
that is dignifying is worth promoting (whereas any deterioration in working conditions or 
opportunities would not be), and that the policy should enhance the range and quality of 
work options of the most insecure groups relative to others, or more than for others. 
While this may seem complicated, the main point is to determine whether or not a policy 
favours the development of more freely chosen work opportunities and work capabilities. 
 
In sum, policies and institutional arrangements can be evaluated via five policy 
principles. Identifying trade-offs and setting priorities would be inevitable. But these 
could be made transparent and subject to democratic processes. Policies that satisfied all 
of the principles would be ideal. Although a comparative assessment of policies might be 
based on more than the five principles, they may be regarded as a coherent set of 
principles consistent with a belief in complex egalitarianism, in which the expansion of 
full freedom requires basic economic security for all.   
 
What we can be reasonably sure about is that the main labour market policies 
developed in the rich industrialised countries in the 20th century were at most suitable for 
societies characterised by full-time wage employment and temporary interruptions of 
earning power. Labour markets in the globalisation era are simply not like that.  
 
Let us consider the main pillars of labour market policy – notably minimum wages, 
unemployment benefits, social insurance and social assistance systems, and labour 
market training schemes – from the vantage point of poverty alleviation. Before doing so, 
we may make a few remarks on direct regulatory interventions with respect to child 
labour and discrimination.  
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(i) Child labour policy 
 
Child labour and poverty are obviously closely related. Very poor communities 
with limited resources usually rely to some extent on the work input of children. It is 
often not easy to ban child labour of all kinds in such societies. In recent years, the ILO 
has modified its stance and its International Programme for the Elimination of Child 
Labour (IPEC) has pursued a policy of banning hazardous forms of child labour.  
 
Such labour threatens children with permanent impoverishment, possibly due to 
injuries and illness picked up through their early labouring experience. However, the 
optimum way to curb child labour is to give families adequate economic security and 
incentives for them to ensure their children enrol and attend primary and secondary 
school. As will be discussed in section 7, schemes such as the Bolsa escola and Bolsa 
familia in Brazil and Oportunidades in Mexico, whereby mothers receive a monthly basic 
income on condition that their children enrol in school and attend for most of the time, 
are much more effective in tackling child labour and in reducing poverty than simple 
bans.         
 
(ii) Anti-discrimination measures 
 
All countries experience patterns of discrimination in the allocation of labour and 
work. The most common is discrimination against women. But that usually goes along 
with discrimination against migrants and ethnic minorities. Measures to combat 
discrimination are essential tools against poverty and inequality. But too often laws are 
passed and then grossly inadequate resources are devoted to ensure that they are 
effectively implemented.  
 
In considering poverty from a global perspective, such measures and issues tend to 
receive short shrift. This is regrettable. One consequence of the ideological onslaught on 
public expenditure around the world has been the rundown of labour inspectorates. An 
example in this respect, and scarcely an extreme one, is South Africa, where the number 
of labour inspectors has fallen drastically, along with their effectiveness and their 
salaries. There and elsewhere, poorly paid labour inspectors are subject to bribes and 
threats, and cannot monitor discriminatory practices and such matters as non-payment of 
wages, neglect of health and safety procedures and so on.  
 
More protection should be provided to both workers and labour inspectors, since 
anecdotal evidence suggests that numerous workers in Asia, Africa and Latin America 
are impoverished by non-adherence to basic labour laws. A simple but rather overlooked 
policy would be to pay labour inspectors higher wages and benefits, improving their 
quality and enabling them to resist ‘backhanders’ and other forms of pressure that make 
them so ineffectual. They play a small, unglamorous role in limiting labour market 
poverty.      
    
(iii) Minimum wages 
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Statutory minimum wages have been a classic weapon for reducing labour market 
poverty. Although they still exist in many countries, they have dwindled in their 
effectiveness. They are hard to apply in flexible informal labour markets, and require 
institutions to monitor them.  
 
Critics have long claimed that minimum wages hurt rather than help low-skilled, 
low-productivity workers, who make up a large proportion of the poor in most countries. 
If they are set at subsistence level, low-skilled workers are either excluded from 
employment or they are employed only in unregistered activities, leaving them vulnerable 
to exploitation and a lack of protective safeguards. 
 
Statutory minimum wages really only work moderately to reduce poverty in 
industrial labour markets where formal employment is high and where collective 
bargaining is widespread. They do not perform well in labour markets characterised by 
widespread informality and flexible labour relations. The critics surely exaggerate their 
negative effect, if only because they cannot be and are not effectively implemented. They 
may, at best, provide a standard of decency, to guide employers and workers on what 
would be fair and reasonable in the actual conditions of the time. That in itself is reason 
enough to maintain them.           
 
(iv) Unemployment benefits 
 
Unemployment insurance benefits, where employees paid contributions or had them 
paid for by their employers, were conceived in the late 19th century, and spread to all 
industrialised countries in the early decades of the 20th century. Attempts were then made 
to introduce them to developing countries, with very limited success. In the rich welfare 
states, benefit schemes started to diverge in the 1970s, with some countries converting 
them into unemployment assistance benefits (means-tested benefits given to those who 
could demonstrate that they were both poor and involuntarily unemployed) and workfare-
type schemes (benefits provided only on condition that the recipient complied with some 
behaviour linked to the labour market, such as taking a low-status, low-paid job or 
entering a labour market training scheme). 
 
The situation has reached the stage where old-style unemployment insurance 
benefit schemes are rapidly disappearing, even in industrialised countries. There is no 
reason to believe that in the foreseeable future they could become an effective weapon 
against poverty and labour market marginalisation in developing countries. Globally, one 
may confidently predict that traditional unemployment insurance benefits have had their 
day.      
 
What is happening in the biggest country in the world will influence what happens 
to unemployment benefit systems elsewhere. China introduced its “three lines of 
guarantee” against the most adverse effects of its policy of retrenchment in the late 
1990s. The three were an unemployment insurance system, a Re-Employment Project 
(based on re-employment centres, where masses of retrenched workers were placed for 
several years) and a basic living allowance. Although unemployment insurance was 
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formally introduced in 1986, it became significant with the 1999 Regulation on 
Unemployment Insurance, which required contributions from employers (2% of the wage 
bill) and workers (1% of earnings). 
 
Unfortunately, few workers have been covered and few of those who have lost jobs 
have received unemployment benefits – perhaps 30% of men, and 25% of women – with 
most receiving nothing at all (Solinger 2001; Giles et al. 2003). A major reason is that the 
scheme has not been implemented or enforced, particularly in private enterprises. To 
make matters worse, the basic living allowance is also rarely paid to the unemployed, 
partly because of a lack of local funding and a lack of recognition that those becoming 
unemployed qualify for the benefit (Lee 2005). And the vast mass of rural migrant 
workers who have flooded into the heavily-polluted mega-cities have simply been left out 
of schemes of social protection, whether they are in jobs or unemployed.    
 
Very few developing countries have functional unemployment benefit systems at 
all, one exception being the Republic of Korea. In most of those that have some scheme, 
only tiny minorities of the unemployed have entitlement to them, as in Argentina – where 
about 6% receive them (ILO 2001) – and South Africa (see Box). It is not much of an 
exaggeration to conclude that the prospects of comprehensive state-based unemployment 
protection in the global economy are very slim indeed.  
 
 
African reality 
 
“We regret that the unemployed people generally do not qualify for any state 
support, leaving them dependent on the support of family and friends to avoid 
starvation.” 
-- Zwelinzima Vavi, General Secretary, COSATU, South Africa.
3
  
 
 
(v) Social insurance versus social assistance 
 
This leads to consideration of the claims and counter-claims made for social 
insurance and social assistance forms of income support. The degree to which national 
social security systems rely on one or other of these methods has been used – over-used – 
to classify so-called welfare state regimes. Contrary to claims made by many analysts of 
‘welfare states’, the reality is that social insurance has gone into decline all over the 
world. It was never ‘decommodifying’ in a real sense, since the funding basis and the 
benefit entitlements were made dependent on labour or the willingness to perform it 
(Standing 2007a).  
 
The underlying principle of social insurance has been that contributions, whether 
paid by employers or employees, would match benefits actually paid out, making the 
system fiscally neutral. In the process, a loose system of social solidarity would be 
                                                 
3 Cited in Alternatives (Cape Town), February 2006, p.2. 
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established, with those fortunate enough not to need benefits subsidizing those who did 
need them. Benefit entitlements were determined by contingency risks, linked to 
unemployment, illness, maternity and so on.   
 
Even in the rich industrialized countries, it has not worked out quite like that, and in 
developing countries it has failed dismally as a weapon against poverty. In flexible labour 
markets with high levels of informality, only very small proportions of the labour force 
are covered by social insurance schemes. Indeed, they are regressive since, to the extent 
that they work at all, they provide benefits and protection for higher-income employees. 
In effect, they fail the Security Difference Principle miserably. One of the problems is 
that social insurance contributions are easy to avoid in informal labour markets, while for 
many of the workers in casual or informal economic activities building up entitlements 
can be practically impossible. 
 
The trend in industrialized countries has been to shift towards much greater use of 
social assistance in determining entitlement to benefits, which means means testing and 
so-called ‘targeting’. The claim made by advocates of moving further in this direction is 
that determining who is poor by checking on their income will direct benefits to the 
poorest, and that such targeting will ensure good use of scarce resources and help 
legitimize tax-based social transfers with middle-class voters. 
 
All parts of that argument are dubious. Evidence shows that means testing is costly 
to undertake and notoriously inequitable and inefficient (see ILO 2004 and sources cited 
there). In developing countries, it is very hard to define or measure the poverty line 
reliably and meaningfully, and whatever measure is used the take-up rate is very low. 
Those who do manage to receive such benefits are often the near-poor rather than the 
poorest. And means testing produces severe poverty traps, since anybody who begins to 
earn income risks losing the benefit. There are other objections, including the 
stigmatizing effects of such schemes. And ultimately they turn out to be discretionary, 
since local bureaucrats and politicians can manipulate them to give to those they wish to 
support and exclude others. Means testing should be used much less than it has been in 
the past two decades. If universal social protection is desired along the lines implied by 
the Policy Evaluation Principles laid out earlier, neither social insurance nor means-tested 
social assistance should be the main instrument. A rights-based system is required, along 
the lines discussed later.   
 
(vi) Labour market training 
    
A great deal of hope and hype is devoted to training, which is often regarded as the 
definitive “active” labour market policy. The common belief is that a major source of 
poverty and unemployment is a lack of skills and inadequate training schemes. Yet the 
evidence for this is scarce. 
 
First of all, statistics on the possession of skills are rare. Most of the available 
information refers to the distribution of jobs and the numbers having primary, secondary 
and tertiary schooling. Both of these types of statistic give very crude indicators of skill 
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per se. There is also little convincing evidence that skill shortages are major impediments 
to economic growth, or indeed a major cause of poverty. 
 
Labour market training refers to government schemes. In some cases, the 
government funds a training centre and funds the attendance of trainees, giving them a 
stipend or simply subsidising the training costs. Such schemes tend to suffer from an 
understandable pattern of ‘creaming’, whereby most of the trainees - particularly most of 
the trainees who successfully complete the training course and who subsequently obtain 
employment - are not from the poorest groups in society.  
 
The other type of training scheme popular around the world is where the 
government, or donor, provides a subsidy to firms to provide more training. This policy 
suffers from three major drawbacks. First, the training is unlikely to be provided to the 
most disadvantaged and poor groups, since these are likely to be perceived as the hardest 
to train and the least likely to yield a high rate of return to the employer. Second, they are 
likely to have a large deadweight effect, i.e., the subsidy will be provided to firms that 
would have done the training anyhow. And third, they are likely to have a large 
substitution effect (or displacement effect), i.e., they are likely to result in firms 
substituting workers receiving the training subsidy for workers or trainees who are not 
doing so.      
 
This paper is not about education more generally. However, there has undoubtedly 
been an international trend towards shaping educational policy in general more towards 
“human capital” formation. Universities and colleges are being encouraged to focus on 
preparing young people for jobs to a greater extent. There is also a strong trend towards 
the privatisation and commercialisation of schooling at all levels, not just at the tertiary 
end of the spectrum. These trends are controversial, since they are transforming the 
nature of education, eroding it as preparation for life and culture in the narrower interest 
of ‘employability’, and making schooling a matter of investment, which make it more 
selective of those who can pay and of those interested in subjects that promise a market 
return. A fear is that if current trends are allowed to continue, cultural education will 
suffer and higher education will become little more than job preparation.    
 
(vii) State pensions as labour market policy  
 
Old-age and other pensions might not be seen as labour market policy. However, 
their existence and design are crucial determinants of patterns of work and labour as well 
as the extent of old-age poverty and the income status of others receiving a form of 
pension, such as those qualifying for disability benefits. 
 
The story of pensions in the globalisation era is fairly clear. There has been a 
shrinkage in coverage by defined-benefit contributory schemes around the world, and a 
growing proportion of the world’s population are not being covered by such pensions. 
Instead, governments and corporations have been shifting to defined-contribution 
schemes, while many more workers are finding that they have no state or corporate 
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pension linked to their employment. In developing countries, only tiny minorities receive 
adequate corporate (so-called occupational) pensions or public sector pensions.  
 
In developing countries in particular, the two types of scheme that have spread are 
individual savings accounts, as developed in Chile in the 1980s and copied to a certain 
extent in many countries since then, and so-called social pensions. Whereas the 
experience in Chile has demonstrated very clearly that the individualised defined-
contribution route leads to greater old-age inequality and poverty among a large 
proportion of pension-age people, the latter offer a realistic means of lowering poverty, 
not only among the elderly but also among their younger relatives. There is convincing 
evidence that they have had a positive effect in reducing poverty and community 
deprivation in countries such as South Africa, Namibia, Nepal and Mauritius (for a 
review of evidence, see Standing 2008a). 
 
Definitionally, social pensions are universal and rights-based. Where they exist they 
result in a very high take-up rate, in excess of 90% of the age group. This compares 
extremely well with all other types of pension scheme. That is a powerful reason for their 
sudden popularity with international agencies. They offer a social protection floor. They 
are also an effective redistributive fiscal instrument. In South Africa, for instance, it has 
been argued that the basic old-age pension has been the only effective means of reducing 
income inequality in the country (Case and Deaton 1998). Social pensions have also 
proved to be affordable, admittedly partly because of the low amount of income provided 
but partly also because of the low administrative cost. They also have the rather valuable 
property of transparency, in that everybody knows what should be paid and who is 
entitled to them, making political or bureaucratic corruption harder.  
 
Social pensions have not escaped criticism. In some countries, such as Namibia, the 
IMF and others have contended that in the longer term they will be too costly as ageing 
increases the number of old-age pensioners. For that reason, ostensibly, they have argued 
that social pensions should be replaced by a targeted scheme based on means testing, 
which would result in a much lower take-up rate and much higher administrative costs. A 
related criticism is that a universal scheme gives money to people who are not in 
financial need. However, this could be rectified by clawing back the benefit through 
taxation, notably on conspicuous consumption goods and ecologically damaging 
expenditure. It should never be forgotten that the alternatives to social pensions, means 
testing and social insurance, are much more costly to administer and often fail to reach 
those in greatest financial need. 
 
A more interesting criticism of social pensions is their implication that the elderly 
deserve and need more income support than other social groups. Why should only the 
elderly receive this universal benefit? One can put forward a presumption that they are in 
the age group where work is hard and where medical needs are greatest. But such 
counter-arguments ignore significant exclusion and inclusion errors. The criticism, rather, 
leads to an argument in favour of a general basic income scheme.     
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In any case, evidence shows that social pensions can and do help fund the schooling 
and nutrition of grandchildren. They also help elderly people participate in the economy, 
and help families in rural areas take risks by buying seeds and fertilisers, knowing that 
they have a regular source of income on which to rely. As such, social pensions may not 
appear to be a labour market policy, but they have beneficial effects on livelihood 
regeneration. 
 
Social pensions make good social policy, passing the Security Difference Principle 
and the Paternalism Test Principle, being non-paternalistic (by applying no behavioural 
conditions) and being rights-based rather than discretionary acts of state or private 
charity.     
     
6. Targeted Labour Schemes 
 
The world has accumulated vast experience and knowledge about special, selective 
or targeted labour market schemes. To a large extent, these can be said to be attempts to 
lessen poverty and various forms of socio-economic inequity without aiming to 
restructure the economy or its underlying social structures. We may focus on four major 
types of scheme that have figured in many developing countries – food-for-work 
schemes, public works, employment and wage subsidies and micro-credit and finance. 
 
(i) Food-for-work schemes 
 
Under this rubric we may include all schemes that offer participants some specific 
commodity in return for labour. It has usually been food, but in some cases it has been 
clothes or other items. The distribution of food parcels in return for labouring on some 
infrastructural project has been an instrument of state policy for many generations and 
has been done all over the world. Some countries have relied very heavily on food-for-
work schemes. In Ethiopia, for instance, albeit an extreme case, the Government has 
devoted 80% of its food assistance to food-for-work projects. Recently, such schemes 
have been recommended as a response to the drastic increase in food prices. In 
Bangladesh the scheme has been expanded recently for that reason.   
 
The primary claim is that such schemes effectively target the poor: they are self-
selecting, since they require applicants to go and queue for opportunities. And like all 
direct employment measures of the workfare kind, they are relatively easy to legitimize 
among the middle class, who can see people working for their food. It is also argued that 
such schemes can relatively easily be focused on pre-determined vulnerable groups, 
notably women. Indeed, the World Food Programme, which has been a major player 
behind food-for-work schemes, has required governments to make women the major 
beneficiaries. 
 
The main shortcoming of food-for-work schemes is the onerous labour often 
involved so that those working in the heat and dust use up more calories than they gain 
from the food given to them at the end. The schemes may actually be detrimental to 
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participants’ health, particularly women, as has been observed in Ethiopia, India and 
Nepal, for instance (Quisumbing 2003; Osmani 1997). 
       
Typically women have obtained a larger share of the jobs than they have in similar 
cash-for-work schemes, as was observed in Lesotho and Zambia, for instance (Subbarao 
2003). One interpretation is that food compensation is more gender equitable. But it may 
also reflect the stigmatization effect of food as a form of compensation, putting off men 
from participating. Nevertheless, the direct provision of food may be more gender 
equitable than cash-for-labour schemes because the benefits for families are more shared. 
 
Besides being inefficient and rarely producing much of lasting value, another 
failing of food-for-work schemes is the powerful tendency for officials to misappropriate 
the food either for their own consumption or more often to sell it for profit. A study of the 
National Food for Work Programme in Andhra Pradesh, India, found that in the villages 
studied the proportion of rice misappropriated by politicians and bureaucrats varied 
between 49% and 98% (Dreze 2006).    
  
In sum, it is doubtful whether food-for-work schemes are an appropriate policy for 
promoting livelihoods except in extreme circumstances. They are unlikely to reach the 
most desperately in need, thus failing the Security Difference Principle, and they are 
obviously paternalistic, presuming that what is missing is food. They are also more 
consistent with charity rather than with the extension of human rights.   
 
(ii) Public works 
 
The use of public works has a hallowed place in both development policy and anti-
unemployment strategies. They are popular with politicians, who can claim the active 
creation of jobs and pose alongside busy workers, while pointing to the valuable 
infrastructure being created. As social policy, public works are often presented as self-
selecting, or self-targeting, on the grounds that only those who are desperately in need of 
income will offer to work on public works projects. And it is often claimed that public 
works not only bring the poor up to or above some poverty line but also help to lower 
wages in the labour market.  
 
Public works have become central to some governments’ anti-poverty programmes. 
In Chile, in 1983 they provided 13% of total employment; in Botswana, in 1985-86 they 
accounted for 21% of the labour force, and in India in 1995 the public works scheme 
known as the Jawahar Rojgar Yojuna programme was supposed to have provided a 
billion person-days of labour (Subbarao et al. 1997). Often the schemes have been 
introduced as a temporary measure, following an emergency or economic shock. Thus, 
the public works scheme in Brazil known as the Northeast Work Front Programme was 
implemented for two years (1998-2000) (Rocha 2000). The trouble with these typical 
schemes is that they do not lead to sustainable livelihoods.  
 
The most famous public works scheme is the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee 
Scheme (EGS), set up in the early 1970s and still going, although it peaked in the 1980s. 
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A key feature is the formal guarantee to give work to any group of at least 50 destitute 
people who organize to demand it. Although widely depicted as a great success, critics 
have pointed out many failings, including the fact that it has resulted in a large number of 
incomplete infrastructural projects.   
  
However, drawing in part on the EGS, in 2005 the Indian Government launched the 
most ambitious public works scheme of all, known as the National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Scheme, to ‘guarantee’ employment to the rural poor. The Government made 
a commitment to provide 100 days of employment per year to each poor household in 
200 districts, with the intention to roll out the scheme to the whole country. We will come 
back to this very ambitious scheme later, after first considering the claims and counter-
claims about public works in general.      
 
Public works can act as a sort of social insurance, or more correctly social 
assistance. If the economically insecure know that such jobs are available, or will 
become available in the seasonally slack period, or would be expanded if there were an 
economic recession, they could be expected to have a greater degree of economic security 
than if that were not the case. It has been suggested that farmers living in the region 
covered by the Employment Guarantee Scheme in Maharashtra, India, were more likely 
to invest in higher-yielding, riskier varieties of seed than farmers living in neighbouring 
states (DFID 2006).       
 
Public works can and often do create some infrastructure. For instance, they can 
result in roads or better water supplies, as was observed to be the outcome of a public 
works scheme in Arba Minch, Ethiopia (Benn 2006). The trouble is that those promoting 
such schemes or investing in them have a vested interest in making such claims.  
 
The questions are whether or not the results are sustainable, durable or more 
efficient than other ways of producing such infrastructure. There are too many stories of 
shoddy output from public works, with roads hastily and cheaply built being washed 
away by the first heavy rains. This is particularly likely where the objective of 
maximizing employment leads to highly labour-intensive methods based on unskilled, 
poorly supervised and ill-trained labour.   
 
 
Public works in South Africa 
 
Faced with chronically high unemployment and income inequality, in 1994 the new 
South African Government made a commitment to use public works extensively. It 
launched a series of schemes – the National Public Works Programme, the Community-
Based Public Works Programme and the Special Public Works Programme. But although 
at one stage they generated about four million workdays in a year, this corresponded to a 
fraction of what was needed to make a serious dent into unemployment (McCord 2004a). 
 
Still the trade unions and the Government were united in pressing for more public 
works, even though they were proving costly and rather ineffectual, as all previous efforts 
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had done (Standing et al. 1996). So, in late 2004 an “Expanded” Public Works 
Programme was set up. But the jobs created were short term, were concentrated in 
labour-intensive, low-productivity activities and involved little or no skill development or 
lasting effect. By 2006, expectations were pessimistic (McCord 2005b). 
 
One factor had been that in 2002 the Government negotiated with COSATU, the 
trade unions’ confederation, a Code of Practice for Special Public Works Programmes. 
This stipulated that wages should be just below the minimum in the relevant sector and 
area. Ironically, this was higher than the actual earnings in many areas of the country, so 
that a large proportion of the temporary jobs were taken by those who were not among 
the poorest and who were often doing other forms of non-wage activity as well. 
            
 
A related criticism of public works is that they tend to be predominantly short-term 
“make-work” schemes. The productivity is low, and the labour is temporary, so that they 
do not provide either value for money or sustainable employment. The inefficiency is 
compounded by high administrative and monitoring costs, so the proportion of the funds 
devoted to public works that actually goes to the intended beneficiaries is cut severely. It 
is generally estimated that, of all forms of social protection, public works have the 
highest administrative costs as a share of total expenditure. 
 
It is also clear that often there are large-scale substitution effects and deadweight 
effects. In other words, public works may merely displace other workers doing the work 
for private firms or they may do something that would have been done anyhow.  
 
Another criticism is that the degree of effective targeting is, in practice, very 
limited. The usual objective is to provide labour for the poorest and for the unemployed 
in greatest financial need. However, numerous evaluation studies have found that this is 
not what usually happens. One obvious problem is that public works discriminate against 
labour-constrained households. Another is that those living far from the work sites have 
the greatest difficulty in taking the available work opportunities. And those with 
disabilities are least likely to be able to do the work on offer. Women, in particular, are 
often penalized because of severe time pressure due to their other work demands in and 
around the home.  
 
Even if public works do succeed in exclusively targeting the poor, they may create 
poverty traps, with all the moral hazards and immoral hazards that these entail. Immoral 
hazards arise from an inducement to lie in order to qualify for participation in a scheme. 
In very poor communities, the poor and vulnerable will have an interest in staying just 
below the poverty line or at least appearing to do so, simply in order to qualify for the 
available income-support scheme on offer. This is surely a perverse incentive.  
 
Some critics have claimed that public works are stigmatizing. This is surely the case 
for some groups. But some advocates of public works have suggested that stigmatization 
is actually a desirable ‘self-selecting’ feature because only those most desperately in need 
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will apply. That is scarcely a “decent work” principle, or consistent with any of the 
Policy Principles outlined earlier.    
 
Another common criticism is that public works favour men, who receive a 
disproportionate number of the jobs. This could be countered by design changes. Indeed, 
if women are historically disadvantaged in the labour market by cultural barriers or 
discriminatory prejudices, public works could be used as a lever to break down the 
barriers. The record in this regard is mixed.   
 
Public works have often had a bias against women. But the South African 
Zibambele scheme had the opposite bias, since 93% of participants were women 
(McCord 2004b; Samson et al. 2006). One reason was that employment contracts were 
given to the household unit, rather than to individuals. Others were that recruiters focused 
on female-headed households and worksites were located near the homes of potential 
worker participants.  
 
Similarly, India’s new National Rural Employment Guarantee scheme has 
established anti-discrimination provisions, access to on-site childcare and worksites close 
to the homes of potential participants (Right to Food Campaign 2008). However, similar 
provisions were included in the long-running Maharashtra Employment Guarantee 
Scheme, which still has only had a minority of women among its participants, even 
though many more women have traditionally been registered in the scheme (Gaiha and 
Imai 2005). 
 
Another controversy centres on the wages paid for those doing public works. Many 
supporters believe they should pay decent wages, or the market wage rate. Others argue 
that they should pay at or even below the minimum wage, as a means of self-targeting the 
poor. This latter has been a common tendency. Often, the wage is determined by that 
prevailing for agricultural manual labour, which is supported by some economists 
(Ravallion 1999). Others have said the wage should be below the market wage (Subbarao 
2003; Hirway and Terhal 1994).  
 
Certainly, the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme long limited 
participation with a low minimum wage, which was how it maintained its claim to 
“guarantee” work for all those applying. Once the courts ruled that it had to pay the 
official minimum wage and particularly after the minimum wage went up, the scheme 
had to ration labour, ceasing to be a “guarantee” (Subbarao 2003).  
 
As with other cash-for-work schemes, if the wage is set below subsistence it 
offends principles underlying minimum wage laws, and may intensify poverty (McCord 
2005b). And if the objective of paying sub-subsistence wages is to induce self-targeting, 
the result may be the opposite of what is intended, because it may mean that only those 
with access to some other source of income can afford to take the low-paying public 
works jobs. Most perversely of all, paying sub-subsistence wages may actually worsen 
the poverty of the participants if they are induced to give up other forms of work, and if 
this disrupts structured livelihood systems in local communities.  
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For example, in the public projects in Malawi, the wage was set at the equivalent of 
US$0.30 per day. An evaluation study commissioned by the government found that the 
very low wages were ineffective in recruiting the very poor, while participants risked 
greater poverty as a result of the hard manual labour that required more food, leaving 
them more exposed to malnutrition and healthcare needs (Chirwa et al. 2004). Poor 
labour-constrained households may be unable to take very low-wage jobs because they 
would have to give up other essential domestic and subsistence activities.      
 
Paying low wages on public works also tends to lower the average wage in other 
jobs in low-income areas. Perversely, this could result in more widespread 
impoverishment, since lower wages for individual workers may mean that families would 
have sub-subsistence incomes. In a few cases, the authorities have deliberately cut other 
wages so as to finance public works. In the Republic of Korea in 1998, in response to the 
‘Asian crisis’, the Government cut public sector wages by an average of 16% to fund 
public works projects. Although it announced that the projects were ‘workfare’, a 
common interpretation was that they were mostly social assistance, with little lasting 
productive benefit (Lee 2000; Kwon 2000).     
  
To compound the problem caused by setting low wages, many public works 
schemes have been dilatory in paying workers, reflecting the slackness of regulatory 
control. In some cases, as the Malawi scheme cited earlier, delays in payment have gone 
on for months, resulting in indebtedness and considerable local distress (Chirwa et al. 
2004).  
 
The debate around wages in public works leads to one crucial conclusion. Countries 
where wages are held up by some regulatory device, such as a minimum wage or national 
collective bargaining, are not suited to large-scale public works schemes intended to be a 
form of social protection. This has led some governments to use ruses to bypass their own 
legislation. For instance, in Argentina the Trabajar public works scheme paid a wage 
well below the statutory minimum wage and claimed that it was not a wage at all, but 
rather “economic assistance”, exempt from the minimum wage legislation. Having 
achieved this legitimation, it then lowered the wage again (Subbarao 2003). Similarly, 
wages on Argentina’s subsequent scheme, Jefes, were set at about half of the mean 
household income (Galasso and Ravallion 2004). And in Brazil, the Northeast Work 
Front Programme paid benefits well below the minimum wage (Rocha 2000). One must 
wonder at the equity of such practices, and the examples set for private employers.   
  
Another criticism is that public works are very prone to political capture, in that 
powerful politicians ensure that the schemes are located in their areas, even though they 
may not be among the poorest. Thus, it has been persuasively argued that the 
Maharashtra EGS benefited the kulak lobby and the Maratha elite (Herring and Edwards 
1983; Patel 2006). Alongside such tendencies, there is likely to be bureaucratic capture, 
with local bureaucrats taking a financial cut in allocating work opportunities. Ultimately, 
these tendencies show that there is usually considerable discretionary decision making.  
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However, the most damning criticism of public works is that they tend not to 
benefit the poorest and most economically insecure. Even the famed Maharashtra EGS 
was found to fail in this respect. It was estimated that only about 30-40% of the total 
public expenditure on the scheme reached the poor, as in the Bangladesh food-for-work 
scheme (Ravallion 1991). Some other schemes may have fared somewhat better, but 
there can be little doubt that the leakages are substantial, due to ineffective targeting, 
administration, corruption and inefficient implementation. 
 
In sum, while public works will remain popular as part of job creation efforts, they 
are dubious on several counts. They often fail the Security Difference Principle, in that 
the jobs are not allocated to the most insecure and poorest. They are also paternalistic, in 
that officials decide what is to be done and, usually, by whom and on what basis. It is 
also doubtful whether public works satisfies the Rights-not-Charity Principle, since they 
are, at best, a way of giving discretionary entitlement to selected individuals or 
households or communities.        
 
 
India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme 
 
Amid a great deal of public fanfare, and as part of what it called the common 
minimum programme, in 2004 the new Indian Government announced that it 
would launch public works around the country to guarantee work to the rural 
poor. This was enacted in the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
(NREGA) of September 2005.  
 
Although modelled on the Maharashtra EGS, its proponents assured the public 
that it would give reality to the right to work and overcome the shortcomings of 
the Maharashtra EGS. The NREGA subsumed other programmes such as 
Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojna and the National Food for Work Programme. 
 
The main objectives were to give a right to work, to reduce poverty and to reduce 
rural-urban migration of labourers. At the outset, in February 2006, the Prime 
Minister said that it would “help us get rid of the scourge of poverty, disease and 
indebtedness. It gives employment; it gives income; it gives a livelihood and gives 
a chance for all to live a life of self-respect and dignity.” The Minister for Rural 
Development went even further, claiming, “It is a permanent, perfect system for 
perfect food security.” 
 
Initially, it was intended to provide a “guarantee” of 100 days of labour in 200 
most ‘backward’ villages, for one adult of any household prepared to do unskilled 
manual labour, for the minimum wage.  
 
One might pose the question: On what Benthamite principle was this decided? 
Perhaps it would have created more welfare gains if it had been concentrated on 
200 areas where there was greatest economic growth potential. In other words, 
there may be an inter-temporal trade-off between immediate poverty alleviation 
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and long-term employment and economic growth. However, the NREGA made the 
commitment to extend the scheme to the whole country within five years, a 
remarkably ambitious commitment.  
 
The NREGA ostensibly gives the poor living in the selected districts the ‘right’ to 
register with a local Gram Panchayat; once registered, the household is supposed 
to receive a job card, and once armed with one of these is supposed to be given 
labour within 15 days of demanding it. This is to be within five kilometres of the 
person’s residence, or an extra 10% of the wage is to be given to pay for 
transport. If labour is not provided within 15 days, an unemployment allowance is 
to be paid.  
 
If given labour to perform, the person is to be paid the statutory minimum wage 
applicable to agricultural workers in the State. And at the designated worksite 
there must be a guarantee of safe drinking water, shade for children, and first aid.   
 
A key objective of the planners is to strengthen the bargaining position of rural 
workers, which is why local plans have to be drawn up with involvement of local 
communities. The Act envisages considerable monitoring actions, including 
‘social audits’ involving local Vigilance and Monitoring Committees (with at 
least one third of their members being women), and use of the new Freedom of 
Information Act of 2005.  
 
The teething pains of the NREGA have been considerable. Critics have questioned 
the process by which funds were allocated from central government to the states, 
the uniformity of wages, the dangers of petty bureaucratic corruption, and the 
fear that it will not generate valuable public assets. Jean Dreze, a prominent 
social scientist associated with the Government, has been scathing. He pointed 
out in September 2006 that one year after the Act was passed, the promised 
Central Employment Guarantee Council was yet to be formed, while the financial 
allocation for administrative expenses had yet to be raised beyond a token level of 
2% of the total NREGA expenditure (Dreze 2006). He concluded, 
 
 “Sometimes the situation reminds me of a notice I saw once in a shop 
window, advertising a second-hand television. It said, “Sound only”.” 
 
Dreze and others have pointed out that the level of awareness of the NREGA in 
many of the selected districts has been very low (Shah 2006). It has even been 
estimated that expenditure on employment generation through public works in 
2006 was below what it was in 2005. It is perhaps too early to determine whether 
this reflects merely teething troubles or an administrative inability to implement 
such an ambitious scheme, or something more fundamental, such as that the 
scheme is an inappropriate instrument for dealing with poverty and economic 
insecurity.  
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Monitoring studies have claimed that besides low awareness among the rural 
poor, there has been delay in issuing job cards and registration discrimination on 
the basis of gender and caste. 
  
According to some observers, the NREGA has been dogged by the sort of petty 
corruption that has always been part of direct intervention schemes in India 
(Menon 2006). In this respect, great hope has been placed in the Indian Right to 
Information Act (RTI), which became fully operational in October 2005, and 
which gives every individual the right to request and receive information on how 
public money is being spent. The person requesting information is obliged to pay 
a small amount, but if their income is below the poverty line, they are exempt 
from the fee. Use of the RTI has apparently led to the exposure of corruption and 
may lead to more of the funds reaching the rural poor.     
     
However, already the cost of the NREGA has been causing political concern. In 
mid-2006, the cost became even more prominent when international credit rating 
agencies urged the Indian Government to hold firm on its budget deficit reduction 
commitments, which were being jeopardized by what was regarded as high social 
spending and the high ratio of public debt to GDP.  
 
 
 
(iii) Employment subsidies 
 
Various finance ministries and prominent American economists have favoured the 
use of employment subsidies, a policy that has been advocated in a number of developing 
countries. The ostensible rationale is that, if employers are offered a subsidy for the extra 
jobs they create, total employment will increase. Edmund Phelps, winner of the Nobel 
Prize for Economics in 2006, has been an enthusiastic advocate of employment subsidies. 
 
The main argument in their support is that, in addition to boosting more demand for 
labour, they help the low paid obtain jobs. It is supposed that these workers do not obtain 
jobs without subsidies because their potential productivity is below the market wage. 
Less widely publicized, subsidies are intended to boost certain sectors and, often, to help 
export industries or strengthen sectors threatened by imports. 
 
However, employment subsidies typically twist the demand for labour towards less-
skilled, lower-paid labour. In doing so, they may well encourage labour-intensive 
production that results in lower productivity in general and even technological stagnation. 
This is scarcely conducive to long-term growth and development. Moreover, labour 
subsidies not only encourage the inefficient allocation of labour and distort relative 
prices, but are also likely to be a subsidy to capital, rather than to workers. They allow 
firms to pay lower wages, knowing that the incomes of workers are being topped up by 
the subsidy, or allowing them to retain the subsidy for themselves. That is by no means 
the only form of petty corruption that labour subsidies induce. 
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Moreover, employment subsidies tend to discriminate against older, well-
established firms in favour of new, growing firms. This is intrinsically inequitable, since 
it penalizes firms that have been providing employment for some time relative to 
newcomers. This could merely result in a substitution of subsidized jobs in new firms for 
non-subsidized jobs in older firms. The net effect on jobs could thus be minimal.  
 
In the global context, although many governments have introduced various forms of 
labour subsidy, they could become an issue before the World Trade Organisation as an 
unfair trade practice. Among the biggest subsidies are earned-income tax credits, as 
developed on a vast scale in the USA and copied in various forms in western Europe. 
They may not be deliberately selective of export or import sectors, but there can be little 
doubt that, at the margin, they influence national competitiveness. 
 
Labour subsidies do not satisfy social justice principles either. In practice, they tend 
to go to the near poor, rather than the most insecure, if they do not merely go to capital 
rather than to labour anyhow. They also go to support paid labour, rather than to all forms 
of work, such as non-wage economic activities and care work.  
 
A final comment on subsidies must be emphasized. The world is awash with them. 
Yet most economists recognise that they encourage inefficiency and tend to go to capital 
more than to workers and the poor. When commentators say that the state cannot afford 
more transfers to the poor, or more social spending in general, they should be reminded 
that, even in developing countries, on average subsidies to the rich reach as much as 5-
6% of total GDP. Labour subsidies are not good for global trade or global development, 
and rarely reach the poor. 
 
(iv) Micro-credit and micro-finance  
 
 Micro-finance and micro-credit have become hugely popular as development tools; 
they are strongly supported by the United Nations, and are promoted within the ILO by 
its Social Finance Programmes. In 2006, the Nobel Peace Prize was given to the founder 
of the Grameen Bank, the leading provider of micro-credit, which has a long history in 
Bangladesh.  
 
Such schemes originated in the Raiffeisen Funds in Germany, which were explicitly 
religious in character, and which have been diffused across the world as micro-credit and 
rotating community funds. Examples exist across Africa, Asia, US inner cities and, more 
recently, eastern Europe. The Indian Government’s “common minimum programme” 
also contains a commitment to expand micro-credit.   
 
The primary feature of micro-credit schemes is the provision of small loans to the 
poor and vulnerable, as start-up capital for small business activity. Micro-credit has been 
seen as assisting people in setting up micro-enterprises or in becoming self-employed. 
Group lending is encouraged, and the outstanding aspect has been the heavy orientation 
of lending to women.  
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The Grameen Bank, Bangladesh 
 
The Grameen Bank was celebrated for many years, but became a source of national 
pride for all Bangladeshis in 2006 when its founder, Muhammed Yunus, received the 
Nobel Peace Prize.  
 
Many governments in other countries have thought its success could be replicated 
in their countries. Some have been disappointed. For instance, in the Philippines, two 
micro-credit schemes launched by the Government in 1994 had very limited beneficial 
effects for women, while a similar scheme in Papua New Guinea in the same year had 
much lower repayment rates than achieved in Bangladesh. Nevertheless, in 2007 the 
Chinese Government reportedly invited the Grameen Bank to experiment with its scheme 
in rural areas of China. 
  
 
Advocates of micro-credit have claimed that it encourages participatory 
involvement, is self-targeting and empowering. Some schemes appear to have a good 
record of reimbursement; others much less so. Crucially, for those concerned with the 
promotion of livelihoods, micro-credit has been seen as a means of tying people over 
during periods of economic difficulty, thereby providing informal insurance, preventing a 
collapse of small-scale businesses and a drift into unemployment.      
    
Wishing to link micro-finance to their mantra of ‘decent work’, the ILO (2005) has 
claimed: 
 
“Microfinance makes a powerful contribution to decent work by providing opportunities 
for small investments in self-employment and job creation. And, through emergency loans, 
micro-savings and micro-insurance, it provides the means for people to manage risks of 
living near the subsistence level.” (ILO 2005) 
 
Without giving convincing evidence, the ILO has also asserted that micro-finance 
helps with its aims of job creation, empowerment of women and reduction of 
vulnerability. It joins in the acclaim that has been the mainstream view for some years.  
 
 However, the main concerns associated with micro-credit schemes are their 
sustainability, their limited scope and their proneness to governance failure. Some believe 
that they are too small to deal with systemic shocks and systemic risk. They are also 
criticized for creating a new form of dependency, drawing the near-poor to rely on the 
micro-credit institution for a series of small loans (Kabeer 2001). It should not be 
overlooked that credit is rarely a way out of poverty, simply because borrowing implies a 
debt that has to be repaid. 
 
 There is also a question mark about the ability of micro-credit schemes to reach the 
very poor, since those working in what has been called the “mini economy” require such 
small amounts of money that even the micro-credit institutions cannot handle the sums, 
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due to standardized administrative and monitoring costs (Matin et al. 1999). And there 
are questions about the cost and sustainability of group loans, which require group 
meetings, group pressures and associated costs (Besley and Coate 1995). 
 
 Most worrying of all is the suggestion that, rather than empowering women, micro-
credit may actually reinforce patriarchal subordination of women (Goetz and Sen Gupta 
1996; Rahman 1999). The suggestion is that women are induced to over-extend their 
work commitments, putting them under more pressure.  
 
 Finally, many observers have questioned the sustainability of micro-credit 
institutions without the large donor assistance they have long been receiving. And it 
appears that there has been a drift away from the original idea of “group lending with 
joint liability” towards conventional individual lending and, in the process, a move away 
from a focus on the poorest and most economically insecure.      
  
7. Regulatory Interventions 
 
The notion of labour regulation has been subject to a great deal of nonsensical 
rhetoric and analysis. In particular, numerous economists and commentators have 
advocated labour market de-regulation, claiming that there has been an international 
move to de-regulated markets. This is far from being the case. The period of globalisation 
has been one in which more new regulations have been introduced than at any time in 
human history.  
 
In fact, it has been an era of labour re-regulation, in which many of the institutions 
and protective regulations built up in the first three quarters of the 20th century have been 
whittled away and replaced by new types of regulation. These have tended to be pro-
individualistic, more favourable for corporations than for employees, or more directive, 
selective and conditional in character.      
 
A classic case in point was Chile. Under Pinochet in the 1970s and 1980s, the 
former freedom-of-association and pro-union regulations were replaced by laws banning 
unions and collective bargaining altogether; then only plant-level bargaining was 
allowed. Even today, the scope for collective bargaining is more tightly regulated than 
was the case before 1973. 
 
However, the country where new labour regulations have been most clear is China, 
as it has gone about the business of fashioning a national labour market. The emerging 
regulatory framework will have repercussions for the global economy, simply because 
China has become one of the two industrial workshops of the world, along with India, 
which has also been re-regulating its labour relations, encouraging labour market 
flexibility and revising its labour law.     
    
8. Cash Transfers as Labour Market Policy for Beating Poverty and Insecurity 
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The dominance of social democratic thinking in social policy and neo-liberal 
thinking in economic policy has combined to block thinking about the simplest way of all 
of responding to income poverty – giving people income in the form of money, as basic 
income transfers. 
 
For decades in the late 20th century this was dismissed almost out of hand. To 
propose it was to risk ridicule. Unconditional transfers in particular were regarded as a 
waste of money, unaffordable, conducive to sloth and socially irresponsible behaviour, 
and a denial of the famed reciprocity principle (something should only be given to 
someone if they give something in return). Only in the past five years have cash transfers 
figured prominently in emergency relief efforts mobilised by the United Nations.  
 
Since the beginning of the 21st century, a remarkable turnaround in thinking has 
occurred. Humanitarian relief organizations have come to appreciate that the advantages 
of cash transfers include speed, transparency and the ability to allow those in need to 
make choices about how they spend the aid, thereby enabling them to retain a greater 
sense of dignity in times of crisis (Creti and Jaspars 2006). 
   
Suddenly, there has been a flourishing of experiments and pilot schemes. As a 
result, we have begun to accumulate substantial experience of what happens when 
conditional or unconditional cash transfer schemes are operationalised. A brief summary 
of some of those schemes should be sufficient to highlight their potential as anti-poverty 
devices.4  
 
Most cash transfer schemes, other than the income-for-school-attendance schemes 
in Latin America, such as the bolsa familia, and social pensions, as discussed above, have 
been introduced in response to ecological or economic shocks and the resultant 
emergencies. They have thus not been introduced in the most propitious of 
circumstances. Nevertheless, the outcomes have been encouraging for those who believe 
they should be utilised more extensively and built into the fabric of social protection 
policy. 
 
Those that have been most carefully evaluated include schemes in Ethiopia, 
Somalia and Zambia. In the Cash for Relief Programme (CfR) in Ethiopia, one of its 
main objectives was to enable households that had been hit by crop failure to rebuild their 
assets, so as to restore the infrastructural relationships that made the economic base of 
those communities sustainable. The evaluation for the scheme’s primary funders, 
USAID, found that the cash grants had been successful in regenerating the livelihoods of 
people living in the area (Brandsetter 2004). Rather than merely consume (which would 
have been likely with food aid alone), they had controlled debts and had invested in 
restoring land productivity. The donors found that cash grants 
 
“allowed individuals and communities to begin making a series of decisions, 
giving them the power to prioritise needs for their families and presenting them with 
a creative way to receive relief assistance with dignity”. (USAID 2004)  
                                                 
4 For a longer review, see Standing 2007b. 
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Also in Ethiopia, in the face of annual food crises, Save the Children, a UK-based 
NGO, has implemented several cash relief projects, and evaluations have concluded that 
they too have functioned efficiently, have been more cost-effective than food aid and 
have had no inflationary effect.5  
 
Another example is the Emergency Cash Relief Program (ECRP) implemented in a 
drought-affected and politically contested zone of north-eastern Somalia in 2003-04. 
Some 13,380 socially vulnerable households, identified as such by an NGO, were each 
given a one-off US$50. The initial rationale for providing direct cash transfers was that 
they constituted a rapid response to an emergency. The programme coordinators found 
that they unblocked the critical economic constraint to livelihood revival.  
 
While there was food available locally, the purchasing power of the local 
population was extremely low and the local credit system was overstretched. The cash 
transfers enabled people to reduce their debts, purchase food and water, and give 
themselves some sense of ‘empowerment’, enabling them to maintain their livelihoods 
and the complex arrangements of work and social support that bound their community 
together. Without the income grant, work and the community would probably have 
collapsed altogether. 
 
The targeting used in the ECRP was complex: the formal conditions for entitlement 
were that the person should be a destitute pastoralist and belong to a ‘structurally 
vulnerable group’, with priority being given to women, minorities, elderly, disabled, and 
members of large families. Village Relief Committees were in charge of identifying 
suitable beneficiaries. Each of those conditions no doubt had some anomalies. But, 
crucially, the coordinators found that the overhead costs were comparatively low – 17% 
of total costs compared with 25-35% for other, commodity-based relief interventions. 
The conclusion was that the cash transfer scheme functioned relatively effectively. In our 
terms, it helped generate work and economic security in very difficult circumstances.         
 
Another example is the Meket Livelihood Development Pilot Project involving cash 
transfers provided in two areas of Ethiopia in 2001-04. In the evaluation carried out for 
Save the Children, it was found that the cost of implementing the scheme was much less 
than the equivalent for food aid schemes (Kebede 2005). The latter had substantial 
transaction costs for beneficiaries (which are rarely taken into account in monitoring and 
evaluation analyses). For instance, because recipients had to share food aid, they had to 
work out how to share. This resulted in time and food being wasted in the course of 
exchanges of food items between households wanting one and not another item. The 
work time involved was also considerable, including the cost of waiting for deliveries and 
for loading and transporting the food. 
 
By contrast, simple cash transfers permitted the beneficiaries to make strategic 
choices for themselves. The evaluation observed that not only did the cash transfers allow 
                                                 
5 Gebre-Selassie and Beshah 2003; Save the Children 2004; Knox-Peebles 2001. 
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households to build up assets, notably through the acquisition of livestock, but also 
enabled many households to reduce the distress renting out of land. Indeed, among the 
benefits of cash transfers were that they enabled recipients to obtain higher crop prices, 
partly by allowing them to sell when prices were more favourable, rather than when they 
were desperate for cash. This is a classic advantage of basic economic security. The 
transfers helped some recipients to pay off debts, others to pool savings in an equb (group 
saving scheme) and others to buy seeds, sheep or goats, thereby enabling them to work.  
 
Cash transfers also enabled more people to work locally, reducing the pressure to 
migrate temporarily in search of cash income, which in turn had a positive impact on the 
children, allowing adults more time at home to care for them and strengthening the 
parents’ moral pressure on them to attend school. This is surely a powerful development 
advantage of cash transfers.                 
  
Another successful example is the pilot Kalomo Social Cash Transfer Scheme 
initiated by the Zambian Government with financial support from the German 
development agency GTZ in two districts of Zambia. The regular cash transfer was 
unconditional, in that it did not require recipients to spend the money in any particular 
way, thus giving beneficiaries a sense of autonomy. However, it was means-tested. 
Beneficiaries were selected by local Community Welfare Assistance Committees, using a 
participatory method to identify the poorest 10% of households by means of a hunger 
poverty line. But crucially the selectivity was based on a Voice mechanism, i.e., 
involvement of a body representing the community.  
 
The selection mechanism also tried to differentiate households by whether or not 
they consisted of members who were unable to work or who were excluded from other 
poverty schemes, such as the food-for-work scheme. It focused on giving cash transfers 
to the most ‘labour-constrained’ households, setting up bank accounts for those in most 
critical need, and providing a modest grant for each household ($8 per month if the 
household had children, $6 otherwise).  
 
Those operating the scheme have claimed that the money was spent on basic 
consumption goods, and education and healthcare for family members (Schubert 2005). 
In other words, it showed that people were able to spend such cash transfers rationally 
and for their own longer-term welfare. It was also apparent that a majority of the 
beneficiary households were headed by elderly persons or women, about half of the 
households were AIDS-affected, and nearly half contained orphans. As with other 
schemes of this sort, it was evident that when women, rather than men, controlled the 
transfers they were more likely to spend a large part of them on their children and their 
family. 
 
The Zambian scheme had a more general message. It has been estimated that if it 
were scaled up to reach the poorest 10% of all Zambian households the cost would 
amount to merely 5% of the total overseas aid to the country, or about 0.5% of its Gross 
National Income. In other words, a national scheme is financially feasible. It would be 
much cheaper than the country’s food aid, and would have the advantage of going 
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directly to the poor and vulnerable, without the high administrative costs and various 
forms of corruption associated with commodity-based schemes. And whereas food aid 
damages local food markets by deterring local producers, cash transfers would do the 
opposite by helping to stimulate local markets. In Zambia, no less than 70% of all social 
transfers are spent on locally produced goods and services, thus generating local 
employment or livelihoods (Samson et al. 2006; DFID 2005).  
 
 
Cash grants in Africa     
 
“Childcare grants, disability allowances, pensions and other direct transfers of 
cash can be used even in countries with poor infrastructure, little capacity to deliver 
services or no interest in reform.” 
                                       --- Commission for Africa Report, 2005. 
 
 
The Zambian, Ethiopian and Somalian cash transfer experiences offer encouraging 
evidence that they are affordable and are conducive to livelihood revival in chronically 
poor areas. In times of emergency, cash grants should not be seen as pure alternatives to 
other forms of commodity-based aid. Such transfers might be inflationary if local food 
supplies are not available, and this may mean that in the initial aftermath of a disaster, 
particularly a quick-onset disaster, food aid should complement cash transfers, to restrain 
inflationary pressures, with direct commodity aid being gradually faded out as local 
producers respond to the increased demand for staple goods and services. Cash transfers 
need complementary programmes designed to boost local supply, as was found to be the 
case following the Mozambique floods a few years ago (Abt Associates 2002).      
 
Following those floods, USAID funded cash grants of about US$92 for 106,280 
flood-affected rural families in a scheme implemented by a private company. Recipients 
were issued with cheques at local sites, while a commercial bank provided tellers who 
were able to cash the cheques, all protected by a local security firm. The outcome has 
important lessons. An impact evaluation found that most of the money was spent on local 
goods and services, which stimulated the local economy, regenerating livelihoods in a 
sustainable way.6  
 
Such schemes have not only been taking place in Africa. Among the growing 
number that have been launched outside Africa as part of emergency and rehabilitation 
programmes funded by foreign donors is the Cash for Herder scheme in Mongolia, 
implemented by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and the Red 
Cross in 2003. The evaluation two years later found that while another in-kind project 
that they had operated was ‘appreciated’ by recipients, it had not helped regenerate the 
local economy, whereas the cash transfer had led to investment in assets that regenerated 
livelihoods. The evaluation concluded, 
  
                                                 
6 Abt Associates 2002; Hanlon 2004; Christie and Hanlon 2001. 
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“The cash approach made use of the creativity and experience of beneficiary 
families to develop strategies out of their crisis…[It] showed that poor people and people 
under severe economic stress are very well capable to handle cash responsibly and 
develop and take strategic decisions on what to spend the money in order to improve the 
livelihood and their families in the medium and long term… most important, beneficiaries 
do become economic and social actors in their own community again, taking their 
decisions on how to spend the money.”  (SDC-IFRC 2005)  
 
The evaluation found additional advantages, in that ‘the response and preparation 
time’ was short, and the administrative overheads were low. These advantages can be 
considerable for hard-pressed officials running such schemes.   
    
By 2005, the SDC had implemented 13 cash grant projects of this type in eight 
countries, including such difficult places as Ingushetia and Mongolia. Its assessments 
have been sufficiently favourable to make the SDC continue to rely on them. But it is not 
alone. In the past few years, the US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), 
which long regarded cash transfers as out of the question, has provided quite substantial 
funds for cash grants in various countries, including its scheme in Ethiopia in 2003. 
 
Tellingly, the growing legitimacy of simple cash transfers was reflected in the 
Group of Eight Statement of 2004, which, when referring to the international response to 
famines, made the commitment,  
 
“We will unleash the power of markets through cash-for-work and cash-for-relief 
programs.”  (Group of Eight 2004) 
   
Thus the scope for cash transfers in Africa, Asia and Latin America has been 
recognized, becoming a significant part of non-contributory social protection and a means 
of enhancing work opportunities. In Latin America, cash transfers have become a central 
part of social and development policy. Both the Bolsa escola in Brazil and the 
Opportunidades scheme in Mexico, and similar schemes in other parts of the region, have 
covered very large proportions of their populations, resulting in the generation of macro-
economic demand for basic goods and services produced within the domestic economy.  
   
 
9. Concluding Remarks 
 
Most labour market interventions in developing countries have suffered from 
common failings – a lack of transparency, high fiscal cost, a woeful lack of 
accountability, chronic inefficiency in the sense of misuse of resources and in reaching 
those for which they are intended, an extraordinary record of failure to reach the poorest 
and most insecure, and a failure to reduce inequalities in the labour market. They rarely 
meet any of the Policy Principles laid out at the outset of this paper. Often the 
expenditure leads to corruption and to much of the money going to groups that have the 
least need for them. And yet hope seems to spring eternal. In particular, countries are still 
being encouraged to look to yesterday’s mechanisms of industrialised countries, with 
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what many still refer to as ‘the Swedish model’ being regarded as a system that is both 
desirable and feasible as well as still with us.  
 
The real message should be that much too much can be expected from labour 
market policies. They are better at assisting in making labour markets function more 
efficiently in various ways, rather than in overcoming poverty and economic insecurity. 
Labour markets are part of the broader economic system, and policymakers would be 
better advised to look to social policies to deal with poverty and the maldistribution of 
income rather than expect that in the near or distant future labour markets will deal with 
these fundamental features of a market economy.  
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